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Abstract 
 
Traditionally, cognitive therapy and the cognitive-behavior  therapies have 
focused on three levels of cognitive phenomenon: automatic thoughts, cognitive 
distortion, and underlying assumptions. Underlying assumptions constitute the 
general notion of what is referred to as "schema." Schemas have traditionally served 
as sort of a template for the way in which an individual views him/herself, the 
world, and others. In addition, a proposed model has also appeared in the 
professional literature that includes memory structures and multimodal 
representations of stored information that serve to explain the concept of schema in 
general. Recently, some controversial research has raised the question as to whether 
separate memory cell networks in the body may play an additional role beyond 
cognitive structures. 
This article reviews some of the research on the role of neuropeptides in the 
process of memory and emotions and raises the question of whether or not an 
expansion of the concept of schema should be considered. The article also 
discusses what scientific support exists at this time and whether we can draw any 
clinical implications from such a theory. The article also discusses the impact of this 
theory on the view of schema resistance and the role of cognitive therapy, 
particularly as it relates to conditions involving trauma. 
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"The Mind and the Body are one and the same thing, which is conceived 
now under the attribute of Thought, now under the attribute of Extension. 
The result is that the order, or connection, of things is one, whether nature is 
conceived under this attribute or that; hence the order of actions and 
passions of our Body is, by nature, at one with the order of actions and 
passions of the Mind."  
(Spinoza, 2001) 
 
Traditionally, cognitive therapy and the cognitive-behavior therapies have 
focused on three levels of cognitive phenomena: automatic thoughts, cognitive 
distortions, and underlying assumptions (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; 
Young, 1990). Underlying assumptions, or schemas, are considered the deepest 
and most fundamental level of cognition and are viewed as the basis for screening, 
differentiating, and coding stimuli that individuals encounter during the course of 
their lifetimes (Beck et al., 1979, p. 13). Beck originally defined the notion of 
schema in his 1967 work, Depression: Clinical Experimental and Theoretical 
Aspects, as the following: 
"A structure for screening, coding, and evaluating the stimuli that impinges 
on the organism. On the basis of the matrix of schemas, the individual is able to 
orient himself in relation to time and space, and to categorize and interpret 
experiences in a meaningful way" (p. 283). 
Although Beck’s definition of schema was the first, and became one of the 
more popular definitions among the cognitive therapies, the basic concept of 
schema is certainly not a new one. The term "schema" originates from the Greek 
root word ΣXHMATA (scheen), which is defined as "to have or to shape." Other 
definitions include: "to plot or to make a detailed plan or outline". It is for this 
reason that future definitions incorporated the term "template" in their descriptions 
(Young, 1990). 
Segal (1988) went on to define schema as: "Organized elements of past 
reactions and experiences that form a relatively cohesive and persistent body of 
knowledge capable of guiding subsequent perception and appraisals" (p. 147). 
Arias and Beech (1987) also expanded on Beck’s original definition and suggested 
that schemas are: "A set of rules held by an individual that guides his or her 
attention to particular stimuli in the environment and shapes the types of 
inferences the person makes from an unobserved characteristic" (p. 110). Young 
(1990) further amplified the original conceptualization, referring to schemata as 
"Extremely stable and enduring themes that develop during childhood and are 
elaborated upon throughout an individual’s lifetime." Young believes that schemas 
serve as "templates for the processing of later experience" (p. 9).  
In all of the aforementioned definitions, the main theme appears to center on 
the representation of highly generalized superordinate-level cognitions that are PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 19 (2010), 2, 221-234 
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resistant to change and exert a powerful influence over thought, affect, behavior, 
and even physiologic processes. Beck further emphasized that individuals with 
chronic or recurring problems often coexisting with personality disorder have 
established early maladaptive schemas in childhood. These schemas direct 
attention to an increased recall of information consistent with the schema. For 
example, depressive schemas focus on loss, deprivation, and failure; anxious 
schemas focus on threat, such as danger to valued aspects of self (Beck, Emery, & 
Greenberg, 1985). Personality schemas are general themes of interpersonal and 
self-functioning, which correspond to vulnerabilities that may be activated by 
current life events. Beck has always underscored the operation of cognitive 
schemas as being the most fundamental factor in his theory of emotional disorders, 
playing a principal role in the maintenance of psychological disorders, as well as 
in the recurrence and relapse of episodes (Beck, 1967, 1976). However, it is 
interesting that Beck chose to use the term "organism" in his 1967 definition of 
schema. This term alone implies that there might be more levels in defining the 
concept than to only cognitive processes. 
The concept of schemas has played a major role in the mental health field, 
deriving from cognitive psychology, cognitive development, and self-psychology, 
as well as attachment theory. Within the cognitive therapy literature alone, the 
term "cognitive schema" has had multiple meanings, which vary according to the 
extent to which they are accessible or inaccessible cognitive structures (James, 
Southam, & Blackburn, 2004; Segal, 1988; Young, Klosko, & Weishaar, 2003). It 
appears that the vast majority of these definitions maintain that schemas have a 
powerful influence over cognition and affect and are often resistant to change. It is 
further believed by cognitive-behavior therapists that schemas exert their influence 
through conscious information processing rather than through unconscious 
motivation or instinctual drive as proposed by psychodynamic theorists. 
Interestingly, many theories posit that emotions operate in the same manner as 
cognitions, viewing them as a primary nonconscious mental process that create a 
readiness for action, disposing individuals to behave in a particular way (Siegel, 
1999). 
 
Memory Structures 
 
Recently, some authors have suggested a need  to revise and expand the 
concept of schema as used by cognitive-behavior theorists, reconnecting its links 
with the memory literature and the manner in which information about life 
experiences is stored (James, 2001, 2003; James, Reichelt, Freeston, & Barton, 
2007). There are two central aspects under consideration. The first aspect involves 
the diathesis-stress model, in which schemas are viewed as memory structures in 
general. This model builds on the notion that there are features that have been 
encoded in one’s past that are stored cognitively and will be activated at some PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 19 (2010), 2, 221-234 
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future date by the presence of an appropriate cue. The cue may be cognitive, 
emotional, or physiological. The second aspect of the revised perspective is 
derived from clinical observation, indicating that once an individual has 
experienced depression, future episodes are likely to share many characteristics 
with that initial experience. Thus, there will be characteristics of cognitive themes, 
behavioral strategies, sensitivities relating to noise and sounds, and even smells or 
other visceral sensations that are replicated later. Consequently, multi-sensory 
information relating to an individual’s depression is stored as some form of 
unitary concept, and it is this multimodal representation that is reactivated during 
subsequent episodes of depression. It is the contention of several recent authors 
that the view of multimodal representation should be used to define the concept of 
schema (James, et al., 2007). This broader view differentiates between the concept 
of schema and core beliefs, suggesting that a core belief is merely one component 
of schema (i.e., the cognitive feature). From the authors’ perspective, schema are 
viewed as representations of previous experiences (i.e., memories) that are stored 
multimodally, containing details about emotional, kinesthetic, olfactory, sensory, 
physiological, neural, and cognitive processes. Therefore, an individual who has 
previously suffered from depression or anxiety will have stored representations of 
what it is like to be anxious or depressed. The more episodes of anxiety or 
depression that one experiences, the more familiar one becomes with the state of 
being depressed and/or anxious. An important concept emerges from this 
discussion of memory as to whether or not such components may house stored 
material in areas other than in cognitive structures. In turn, this raises the question 
of whether or not schemas involve a complex system of multiple layered 
component parts that are activated at various times, depending on stimulus cues. In 
other words, do the multimodal aspects that involve emotion and other sensory 
stimuli, such as physiological, neural, and olfactory, consequently expand what we 
currently accept as that definition of cognitive structure to an interrelated network 
that involves myriad domains that are not limited to only thought processes? This 
may be particularly salient with regard to disorders that involve physical illness, 
injury, or trauma. 
Recent research has proposed the idea that emotion and cognition strongly 
interact and are only minimally decomposable in the brain, and that the neural 
basis of emotion and cognition should be viewed as more strongly non-modular 
than once thought. While some evidence has also linked emotions to the body and 
its affect on consciousness (Damasio, 1999; McIntosh, 2000; Mesulam, 1998), 
there has been other evidence that suggests that the opposite may be true (Pessoa, 
2008). 
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Memory Cell Structures 
 
Some research has suggested that memory cell structures may be transported 
through organic chemicals in the body known as peptides. This concept was 
originally proposed by Candace Pert, a NIMH researcher and formerly a professor 
of cell physiology and biophysics at Georgetown University School of Medicine 
and later expanded by Ekman and Davidson (1994). Pert, who is an expert in 
peptide pharmacology, believes that the mind and body are in constant 
communication with each other through organic chemicals known as "peptides." 
Peptides, which are substances in the body, formed from the linking of amino 
acids and present in the brain, as well as in other major organs of the body. Pert 
hypothesizes that memory can be accessed anywhere in the peptide preceptor 
network, ranging from the brain and pathways through internal organs, including 
the very surface of our skin. These research findings indicate that neuropeptides 
and their receptors form an information network within the body that affects 
cognition and emotion (Pert, 1986, 2002). The first component of the molecules of 
emotion is the molecule found on the surface of cells in the body and brain and is 
known as the opiate receptor. In the early 1970s, Pert’s discovery of the opiate 
receptor launched her career as a bench scientist. Pert identified a mechanism by 
which to measure opiate receptors and, thereby, substantiate their existence (Pert, 
1997; Pert, Ruff, Weber, & Herkenham, 1985). 
Receptors in molecules are comprised of proteins, tiny amino acids strung 
together in crumpled chains that appear almost like beaded necklaces that have 
folded in on themselves. If one were to assign a different color to each of the 
receptors that has been identified, the average cell surface would appear like a 
multicolored mosaic of at least 70 different hues, 50.000 of one type of receptor, 
10.000 of another, 100.000 of a third, and so on. A typical neuron, or nerve cell, 
may possess millions of receptors on its surface. Molecular biologists are now 
able to isolate these receptors, determine their molecular weight, and eventually 
decipher their chemical structure, which means identifying the exact sequence of 
amino acids that make up the receptor molecule. 
Receptors function as sensory molecules, similar to electronic scanners. Just 
as one’s eyes, ears, nose, tongue, fingers, and skin act as sense organs, so do these 
receptor molecules. The only difference is that these receptors function on the 
cellular level; that is, they hover in the membranes of one’s cells, vibrating and 
waiting to detect messages carried by other vibrating structures that are made up 
of amino acids. Many of these amino acids cruise along, diffusing themselves 
through the fluids surrounding each cell. All receptors consist of proteins and 
cluster in a cellular membrane, waiting for the right chemical keys to connect with 
them through intercellular fluids. This process is known as "binding". 
Much in the same way that receptors are constructed, peptides are comprised PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 19 (2010), 2, 221-234 
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of strings of amino acids. Peptides are not limited to the brain, but can be found in 
every part of the organism. Although peptide structures are deceptively simple, the 
responses they elicit can be extremely complex. This complexity has led to their 
classification under a wide variety of categories, including hormones, 
neurotransmitters, neuromodulators, growth factors, gut peptides, interleukins, 
cytokines, chemokines, and growth inhibiting factors. These terms all come under 
the rubric of what may commonly be referred to as "informational substances" 
because they point to the common function as a messenger, distributing 
information throughout the organism. 
Pert’s controversial work proposes that peptides exist in all parts of the body. 
Until 1984, it was firmly believed that emotions clearly originated in the brain and 
that emotion and cognition were  separate entities (Pessoa, 2008). It is now 
accepted that cognition and emotion involve complex interactions in the brain, 
strongly blurring the distinction between the two (Cohen, 2005; Drevets & 
Raichle, 1998; Pessoa, 2008). It is Pert’s proposal that peptides and other ligands 
should also be considered "biochemicals of emotions" and exist in other parts of 
the body, as well as the brain (Pert et al., 1986). 
 
Reciprocal Influences of Physiology, Cognition, and Emotion 
 
In 1984, Schmitt introduced the term, "information substances", to describe a 
variety of transmitters, peptides, hormones, factors, and protein ligands 
responsible for transmitting information. Alongside the conventional model of 
synaptic neuronal circuitry, Schmitt proposed a parasynaptic or secondary parallel 
system where chemical information substances travel with the extracellular fluids 
circulating throughout the body to reach their specific target cell receptors. 
Neuropeptides have been discovered not only in the rows of nerve ganglia on 
either side of the spine, but in the end of various organs themselves (Pert et al., 
1986). These discoveries opened the way to the notion that peptides and other 
informational substances are the biochemicals  of emotion and that their 
distribution in the body’s nerves has all types of significance. In this respect, the 
body becomes the nonconscious mind, so to speak. It was hypothesized that 
repressed traumas caused by overwhelming emotion are able to be stored in body 
parts, affecting one’s ability to feel the part or even move it. The new work 
suggests that there are infinite pathways for the conscious mind to access and 
modify the unconscious mind and the body, and provides an explanation for a 
number of phenomena that the emotional theorists have been considering 
(LeDoux, 1996; Siegel, 1999). 
In this respect, every change in physiological state is accompanied by an 
appropriate change in the mental/emotional state, conscious or unconscious, and 
conversely, every change in the mental/emotional state, conscious or unconscious, PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 19 (2010), 2, 221-234 
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is accompanied by an appropriate change in the physiological state. In essence, 
mental and physiological states are a two-way street. This hypothesis has led to 
another insight into the meaning of the discoveries with regard to peptides and 
their receptors and about the theories regarding molecules and emotions (Pert et 
al., 1985). 
Pert and colleagues (1997) believe that, as a result, we can no longer consider 
the emotional brain to be confined solely to the classical locations of the 
amygdala, hippocampus, and hypothalamus. Other anatomical locations have been 
identified where high concentrations of almost every neural peptide receptor exist; 
locations such as the dorsal horn or backside of the spinal cord, which is the first 
synapse within the nervous system where all synaptic sensory information is 
processed (Pert, 1997). This raises many complex questions about what becomes a 
thought rising to consciousness and what remains as thought pattern lodged in a 
deeper level of the body and mediated by various physiological receptors. The fact 
that memory is incurred or stored at the receptor level might suggest that memory 
processes could be emotion-driven and not always a part of conscious awareness. 
This theory is in sharp contrast with other theories that contend that emotions are 
directly involved in conscious (or unconscious) evaluation of events (Arnold, 
1960). While some strong evidence links emotions to the body (Damasio, 1994), 
other research suggests that emotional states or moods are produced by the various 
neural peptide ligands (small molecules that specifically bind to a cellular receptor 
that then conveys informational messages to the cell) (Ekman & Davidson, 1994). 
This research suggests that what we experience as an emotion or feeling is also a 
mechanism for activating a particular neuronal circuit, simultaneously throughout 
the brain and body, which generates a behavior involving the entire system with 
all of the necessary physiological changes that behavior would require. Ekman and 
Davidson (1994) developed a formulation that each emotion is experienced not 
only through the brain, but throughout the organism as well. 
 
Cellular Memory 
 
Subsequent findings support the concept of the direct effect of endogenous 
neuropeptides on cognition as well (Azmi, Norman, Spicer, & Bennett, 2006). 
These results lead to speculation about how much memory is actually stored in the 
cellular units of the body in addition to the cognitive centers of the brain. While 
such a concept clearly raises skepticism for a variety of reasons, if it were 
accurate, it may certainly explain, in part, why some schemas are so resistant to 
change, particularly those involving medical illness or physical injury. 
Additional research has begun to address the issue linking neural function, 
cellular physiology, and molecular genetics to cognitive and emotional processes 
(Taylor & Liberzon, 2007). Further studies, now in progress, examine how cellular PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 19 (2010), 2, 221-234 
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structures store memory on interaction and trauma and the manner in which it is 
communicated through the body’s system. A recently published study by Issabelle 
Mansuy and colleagues at the University of Zurich found that the enzyme 
calcineurin and the gene regulation factor Zif268 can decisively determine the 
intensity of emotional memories (Baumgärtel et al., 2008). The researchers in this 
study addressed the effects of calcineurin on the amygdala by conditioning mice to 
associate a sugar solution with nausea. Mice were used as a model system because 
their learning processes are very similar to those in humans and have established 
behavioral tests in the past. The results showed reduced activity in the conditioned 
mice compared to the mice in which no association with nausea had been 
generated. The results indicated that this association persisted for months 
afterwards and the mice, in response, avoided the sugar solution during clinical 
trials. Because calcineurin is a negative regulator of learning and memory, its 
activity needed to be reduced to enable strong memorization. The researchers 
selectively activated and deactivated the enzyme in nerve cells of the brain of 
transgenic mice, indicating that their selective activation and inactivation in nerve 
cells was important due to the fact that calcineurin was an enzyme that occurred in 
a number of different cells throughout the body. The researchers hypothesized in 
their study that inactivating calcineurin strengthened the memory of the 
association between sugar solution and nausea, whereas the memory was 
weakened by increased calcineurin activity. The results further suggest the 
connection that the period of time needed to suppress the negative memory by 
purely positive memory could be prolonged or shortened respectively by this 
intervention. 
The outcome of this study suggests that negative memories do not necessarily 
disappear, but merely descend in a manner of priority and are outweighed by 
newly learned positive memories. Further, while some material regarding 
traumatic events may vanish from memory, extreme cases of emotional 
recollection may remain stored in these cells for a lifetime. This is analogous to 
overwriting material on one’s computer, wherein some material may be erased, 
but other content may remain embedded on the hard drive permanently. Active 
intervention is, therefore, necessary to reduce the priority level of these negative 
memories, some of which may be invoked by cognitive restructuring or 
mediational techniques. However, other content may remain very resistant to 
change. 
 
Case Example 
 
Let us consider an example of how all of this might work. In the case of 
traumatic injuries, such as physical or posttraumatic stress disorder, an individual 
might be affected by a trauma on multiple levels (i.e., thoughts, olfactory, 
auditory, or various other sensations) (Dattilio & Castaldo, 2001, 2006). When PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 19 (2010), 2, 221-234 
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there is traumatic physical abuse wherein an individual is exposed to environments 
in which he or she sustains considerable physical trauma, the memory of such 
abuse might be stored on a number of levels (Dattilio & Castaldo, 2001, 2006). 
Consider the case of Sara, whose father was a heavy consumer of alcohol and 
would often come home intoxicated and physically abuse her and other family 
members. Sara’s abuse occurred repeatedly over the course of a number of years. 
Consequently, she developed the basic schema that "alcohol makes people violent 
and dangerous." Because Sara sustained many physical injuries from her father’s 
abusive behaviors, she was exposed to stimuli on multiple levels (i.e., auditory, 
her father shouting; olfactory, the smell of alcohol and perspiration on her father; 
and tactile, the pounding of his fist or the sting of his belt). The effect of this 
repeated trauma also set off a number of internal reactions, such as urinary 
excitation, which included loss of bladder control when her father would yell at 
her; nausea, as a result of increased stomach acid when she became tense and 
anxious; and myriad other physiological responses. All of these bodily sensations 
certainly serve as cognitive memory triggers as proposed by James et al. (2007). 
However, if we also consider the theory of the existence of separate memory cell 
networks that are housed in the individual organs themselves, and store 
information regarding trauma and other events, this might very easily apply to 
Sara’s case, whose cognitive processes were also affected by way of cellular 
communication, as well as the psychological effects of the trauma. Even though 
this sequencing is arduous to measure; nonetheless, we must ask ourselves 
whether or not schemas remain limited to memory structures in the brain, or do 
these memory structures also extend beyond cognitive processes? Sara’s general 
schema that alcohol is "poison and it makes people crazy and dangerous" 
obviously affects her on multiple levels. For example, she may feel the need to 
avoid certain friends and loved ones who drink, even in moderation, because she 
experiences nausea or a general tenseness in her body when she smells the 
alcohol. Because of the multisensory impact that the trauma has on her body’s 
entire system, she may not be consciously aware or in control of how extensively 
the trauma affects her whole being and the choices she makes. Perhaps this 
suggests that in Sara’s case, and others, cognitive-behavior therapists may need to 
look beyond the scope of cognitive processes and restructuring to take into 
account the full multisensory perspective. We may be more limited than once 
thought to other sensory systems or body anchoring that contributes to a resistance 
to change. When Sara says that she has a bad "gut feeling" upon smelling alcohol, 
it has a particular meaning on a multisensory level that may not always respond to 
cognitive mediational strategies or behavioral exposure and desensitization. 
Excitement and anger have long been known to increase gut motility. All of these 
sensations may need to be considered and addressed in some way during the 
course of treatment in order for Sara to fully rehabilitate. As an example, during 
the course of treatment, particular attention may need to be paid to the visceral PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 19 (2010), 2, 221-234 
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reaction that Sara experiences to the trauma and, thus, acknowledging these 
sensations as visceral and not only attempting to hammer away relentlessly at 
restructuring her thinking, but to consider additional interventions. 
Another classic example of this dynamic is veterans of war who experience 
shell shock because of their exposure to battle. Such conditions involve visceral 
reactions in addition to cognitive interplay, sometimes lasting for decades after the 
initial trauma, despite years of psychological and pharmacological treatment. 
Desensitizing individuals to such a reaction can prove quite challenging, even with 
repeated exposure. 
Individuals such as George Engel, who hypothesized that his biopsychosocial 
model of conceptualization may provide a more comprehensive way of viewing 
mental illness (Engel, 1977), raised such considerations decades ago. In Engel’s 
attempt to integrate psychosocial issues into medical practice, he emphasized the 
biological system, which included anatomical, structural, and molecular substrates 
of the human system and its influence on a person’s overall functioning. Engel 
urged practitioners to maintain a comprehensive perspective on all illnesses in the 
interest of obtaining effective results and recommended that it become a regular 
part of mental health assessment (Campbell & Rohrbaugh, 2006; Dattilio, 2005). 
Unfortunately, Engel only suggested that various levels of functioning interact and 
did not expand on the mechanics of how they interact. Therefore, more evidence 
to support such scientific theory is needed. 
 
Clinical Implications 
 
If the notion of stored memory in body cells or peptide networks were to 
prove accurate, then it may raise a very important consideration with regard to 
how these body chemicals communicate with the brain and how this process 
affects what we currently regard as "cognitive memory." If this information is 
indeed communicated subtly through other channels, then the question remains to 
what extent does it influence conscious thought and memory? This area of inquiry 
has major implications with regard to the limitations of our work in restructuring 
schemas. This is especially true as it applies to stored memory regarding trauma. 
When addressing the effects that external events may have on our bodies and our 
psyche, we may need to reconsider the concept that some of the stored memory 
may be unreachable with the repertoire of contemporary therapeutic techniques 
that we have at our disposal. Additional exploration and research in the use of 
innovative interventions may be necessary in order to affect change. 
Since the immune system, like the central nervous system, has memory and 
the capacity to learn, we might hypothesize that a form of storage for information 
is located not only in the brain, but also in cells that are distributed throughout the 
entire body. If the mind is defined by brain-cell connection, as it has been in PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS 19 (2010), 2, 221-234 
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contemporary science, then this model of the mind can be viewed as extending to 
the entire body since neuropeptides and their receptors are intricately entrenched 
in the body’s system as well. The brain is undeniably well integrated with the rest 
of the body at a molecular level. This is one of the reasons why therapeutic 
cloning would not likely be successful for serious mental illnesses (Dattilio, 2002). 
As a result, it is a reasonable conclusion that the mind is also in the body in the 
same sense that the mind is in the brain and that schema is likely to encompass 
both, albeit at different levels. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This paper raises interesting food-for-thought - namely, whether the concept 
of schema extends beyond cognitive structures to the role of neuropeptides in 
cellular memory. 
The aim of this paper is not to propose a well-grounded theory of cellular 
memory and emotions. If anything, the scientific support is in its early stages and 
is far from offering any solid basis for consideration. However, it is enough to 
raise awareness about the potential for memory to extend beyond what we know to 
be cognitive structures. Thinking about such expansion would serve the interest of 
science in several ways. If we become too complacent in our beliefs about the 
potential limits of cognitive structure, then we inhibit our growth toward 
advancement of new ideas. Even if  these proposed theories lack the rigorous 
scientific evidence to fully support them, they may still be worth contemplating 
and exploring further in order to keep an open mind about the potential limits 
involved. 
One of the obvious limitations of this theory is the difficulty in accessing and 
measuring the stored memory cells throughout the body. As mentioned previously, 
this also has implications as to what interventions would be effective in addressing 
such memories and facilitating change.  
Clearly, it behooves us to look beyond our basic understanding of cognition 
and memory structures in the best interest of science and in the endeavor to 
develop a comprehensive conceptualization of schema. Although we may not yet 
be able to effectively address memories stored in body cells, we may be able to 
incorporate this knowledge into a greater understanding of the broad concept of 
schema, as well as the resistance that accompanies certain schema content. This is 
particularly important as we seek to understand our limitations and possibilities as 
clinicians.  
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